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Abstract. Transportation Networks and Logistics 4.0 work on the basis of integrated systems. These systems are enabled by standards which are widely used
for the communication between IT-Systems. Due to individual requirements,
standards are customized by companies. The extent of individualization has not
yet been investigated. Therefore, we applied an empirical analysis on two mature
logistic communication standards to identify the standard-application gap by calculating the interoperability between the applied standards. Within these results,
we expand the standardization theory by simulating the network effects and the
standard diffusion and quantify the impact of the company specific individualization of logistic standards. The identified findings help to improve the standard
diffusion model and to improve the development of logistic standards.
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Introduction

Global supply chains work with integrated logistics systems [1]. This integration offers
several performance benefits [2], and is necessary for concepts like Industry 4.0 [3]. To
accomplish a certain level of integration, standardization is necessary [4], [5]. Standards therefore have economic advantages like positive network externalities [6], [7]
economics of scale [8] and the reduction of transaction costs [9], which are widely discussed theories. Theoretical research on standards deals to a large extent with network
effects. Participants benefit from the advantages if the number of participants increases
[10], [11]. Specifically, this means that the benefit for a standard user grows stronger if
more actors implement the standard. This is combined in the standardization model
from Weitzel et al. where the adoption decision is taken as soon as the advantages exceed the costs [11]. Consequently, the decision to introduce a standard is strongly linked
to the expectation of how the other actors in the corresponding environment (e.g. within
a certain industry) decide, which is known as the standardization problem. In conclusion, the adoption of a standard is more influenced by the anticipated diffusion than on
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its actual direct benefit, i.e. its quality [11]. In the theoretical concepts of standardization, deviations have not yet been taken into account. This is based on the assumption
that a standard is either not or fully implemented, and then becomes perfectly interoperable (and thus compatible). This simplifying assumption leads to a significant theorypractice gap. Therefore, we want to address the hypothesis that there is a direct impact
on the standardization deviation, e.g. network effects, due to an interoperability gap.
In this article, we want to close this gap by extending the standardization model
developed by Weitzel et al. Therefore, we introduce the interoperability metric from
Zhu and Whu [12] and apply it with real data to derive the real interoperability of
EANCOM D.96A standard messages. This mature and widely used standard defines
several communication massages which are used in different parts of the supply chain.
In the next step, we simulate the impact of this metric on the diffusion of the standards
and network effects to conclude with an outlook of our future research.

2

Implications of company specific standard adjustments on
network effects

Interoperability describes the agreement which exists if, for example, two business partners use the same standard. In practice, this results in different variants, which means
that only a certain part of the defined data elements is used and, if necessary, individually defined elements are added. The incompatibilities are eliminated by bilateral coordination within the implementation of the standard. Interoperability measures the extent
to which the data elements of two instances overlap (1) [12]. It describes the interoperability values Iij between two actors i and j, where Di is the set of data elements required
by user i. The interoperability values in this paper are calculated from approximately
fifty thousand messages of EANCOM standards and result in the arithmetic mean for
orders 0.7842 (ORDERS D.96A) and shipping notifications (DESADV D.96A) of
0.8684. The messages were provided and anonymized by an IT service provider. To
investigate the impact of the interoperability on to network effects and therefore on the
further adaptation of standards, we use the network model by Weitzel et al. [11] and
extend it by including the loss of efficiency produced by a lower interoperability.
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The net gain of the whole network can be calculated as coordination efficiency (𝐶𝐸)
which is the sum of the ex post network benefits of each actor 𝐸" in a network with 𝑛
actors, where 𝑐"# is the direct network effect if the standard is used between actor 𝑖 and
𝑗 when the standard is fully interoperable (2). 𝐼"# describes the interoperability of the
standard between the actors, xj is a binary variable that indicates whether j uses the
standard and 𝐾" represents the cost for an actor 𝑖 to introduce the standard.
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Table 1. Parameters used for the simulation
𝑛

𝜇(𝑐) 𝜎(𝑐)

𝜇(𝐾)

𝜎(𝐾)

𝜇(𝐼)

𝜎(𝐼)

𝐼7

1

0

1

Standard

Model

(ideal)

Base model

20 1000

200

variable 1000

S2 DESADV

Without I-Anticipation

20 1000

200

variable 1000 0.8684 0.0608

S3 DESADV

With I-Anticipation

20 1000

200

variable 1000 0.8684 0.0608 0.8684

S1

1

S4

ORDERS

Without I-Anticipation

20 1000

200

variable 1000 0.7842 0.0866

S5

ORDERS

With I-Anticipation

20 1000

200

variable 1000 0.7842 0.0866 0.7842
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(2)

To decide if an actor adopts the standard (and therefore the value of xj), an ex-ante
calculation of the benefit can be used by each actor. The benefit has to be estimated
since the actors don’t know in advance who will adopt the standard (3). Here pij is the
probability that actor i estimates for actor j to adapt the standard. 𝜙j is the number of
j' s communication partners. In this first simulation we assume a full-density network,
hence 𝜙" = 𝑛 − 1. To further evaluate the effects of interoperability we examine the
effects of the actors knowing of interoperability losses (I-anticipation). In this case
𝐼7 = 𝐼, otherwise 𝐼7 = 1.
𝐸C" = ∑:#;< 𝑐"# 𝐼7"#= 𝑝"# − 𝐾"
#@"

with
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If the expected benefit 𝐸C" > 0, then actor 𝑖 will implement the standard and 𝑥" = 1. The
results of the simulation are shown in Figure 1. Due to the possibility of an actor falsely
estimating network effects that exceed the standardization cost, it is possible that the
standard is adopted by not enough actors to fully utilize network effects, which leads
to a negative net gain of the network. This is referred to as the standardization gap. It
can be seen, that a lower interoperability impacts the network effects. If the cost for the
introduction of the standard is low enough, there is no difference whether 𝐼-Anticipation is used or not. It should be noted that, even though standard adoption is higher at
lower costs when the actors do not anticipate the interoperability, the standardization
gap is more severe without 𝐼-Anticipation.
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Figure 1. Simulated network effects

3

Conclusion and future work

Within the first simulation we could prove the effect of the interoperability on the standardization gap. In addition, we simulated the scenario with I-Anticipation and without.
Therefore, we can conclude three major findings.
First, we can prove the hypothesis, that the individual and collectively achieved net
benefit effects from a standard introduction with decreasing interoperability are constantly being reduced. Deviations in standards can lead to more or less severe economic
losses. The second finding is that with medium to low standardization costs, it can
provide economic sense to keep the actors unaware of possible interoperability losses.
The area in which such a disinformation strategy offers a higher networkwide benefit
increases as the expected interoperability decreases. However, in the case of mediumhigh cost, it is more advantageous for the actors to anticipate interoperability and therefore decide against a standard introduction. In the case of very low or high standardization cost, both strategies achieve identical results (i.e. no or complete standardization). The standardization gap can be divided into a centralization gap that has already
been extensively researched and an interoperability gap that is shown for the first time
in this paper and depends on the level of anticipated interoperability. This additional
gap delays the diffusion of a standard, since the actors only consider an introduction if
the cost of standardization is significantly lower, which concludes the third finding.
In conclusion there are two main points for further research. First, we want to expand
the simulation to different standards to gather more practical insights on the deviation
and use them for the simulation. In addition, we want to focus on the company and
industry specific standardization gap. In the second step, we want to take the model
extensions based on Weitzel et al. into account. These include, for example, the parallel
availability of several standards with different interoperability factors, diffusion paths,
different network topologies (𝜙" ≤ n − 1) or several periods of time in which actors
can subsequently make their individual decisions. Nevertheless, it is already clear from
this study that losses in interoperability have a lot of theoretical implications for the
theories of standardization, standard diffusion and network effects.
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